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1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses Carnap’s work on probability and induction, using the
notation and terminology of modern mathematical probability, viewed from the
perspective of the modern Bayesian or subjective school of probability. (It is a
much expanded and more mathematical version of [Zabell, 2007]). Carnap ini-
tially used a logical notation and terminology that made his work accessible and
interesting to a generation of philosophers, but it also limited its impact in other
areas such as statistics, mathematics, and the sciences. Using the notation of
modern mathematical probability is not only more natural, but also makes it far
easier to place Carnap’s work alongside the contributions of such other pioneers of
epistemic probability as Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, I. J. Good, L. J. Savage,
and Richard Jeﬀrey.
Carnap’s interest in logical probability was primarily as a tool, a tool to be
used in understanding the quantitative conﬁrmation of an hypothesis based on
evidence and, more generally, in rational decision making. The resulting analysis
of induction involved a two step process: one ﬁrst identiﬁed a broad class of
possible conﬁrmation functions (the regular c-functions), and then identiﬁed either
a unique function in that class (early Carnap) or a parametric family (later Carnap)
of speciﬁc conﬁrmation functions. The ﬁrst step in the process put Carnap in
substantial agreement with subjectivists such as Ramsey and de Finetti; it is
the second step, the attempt to limit the class of probabilities still further, that
distinguishes Carnap from his subjectivist brethren.
So: precisely what are the limitations that Carnap saw as natural to impose?
In order to discuss these, we must begin with his conceptS of probability.
2 PROBABILITY
The word ‘probability’ has always had a multiplicity of meanings. In the beginning
mathematical probability had a meaning that was largely epistemic (as opposed
to aleatory); thus for Laplace probability relates in part to our knowledge and in
part to our ignorance. During the 19th century, however, empirical alternatives
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arose. In the years 1842 and 1843, no fewer than four independent proposals for an
objective or frequentist interpretation were ﬁrst advanced: those of Jakob Friedrich
Fries in Germany, Antoine Augustin Cournot in France, and John Stuart Mill and
Robert Leslie Ellis in England. Less than a quarter of a century later, John
Venn’s Logic of Chance [Venn, 1866], the ﬁrst book in English devoted exclusively
to the philosophical foundations of probability, took a purely frequentist view of
the subject.
Ramsey, in advancing his view of a quantitative subjective probability based on
a consistent system of preferences [Ramsey, 1926], deftly side-stepped the debate
by conceding that the frequency interpretation of probability was a perfectly rea-
sonable one, one which might have considerable value in science, but argued that
this did not preclude a subjective interpretation as well. During the 20th century
the debate became increasingly more complex, von Mises, Reichenbach, and Ney-
man advancing frequentist views, and Keynes, Ramsey, and Jeﬀreys competing
logical or subjective theories.
Carnap sought to bring order into this chaos by introducing the concepts of
explicandum and explicatum. Sometimes philosophical debates arise unnecessar-
ily due to the use of ill-deﬁned (or even undeﬁned) concepts. For example, an
argument about whether or not viruses constitute a form of life can only really
arise from a failure to deﬁne just what one means by life; deﬁne the term and
the status of viruses (whose structure and function are in many cases very well
understood) will become clear one way or the other. This is essentially an opera-
tionalist or logical positivist perspective, a legacy of Carnap’s days in the Vienna
Circle. For Carnap the explicandum was the ill-deﬁned concept; the explicatum
the clariﬁcation of it that someone advanced.
But probability did not involve just a dispute over the explication of a term.
The term itself did double duty, being used by some in an epistemic fashion (the
degree of belief in a proposition or event), and by others in an aleatory fashion
(a frequency in a class or series). To unravel the Gordian knot of probability, one
had to sever the two concepts and recognize that there are two distinct explicanda,
each requiring separate exegesis.
2.1 Early views
In his paper “The two concepts of probability” [1945b], Carnap introduced the
terms probability1 and probability2, the ﬁrst referring to probability in its guise as
a measure of conﬁrmation, the second as a measure of frequency. This had twin
advantages: putting the issue so clearly, debates about the one true meaning of
probability became less credible; and the more neutral terminology helped shift
the argument from issues of linguistic useage (which, after all, vary from one lan-
guage to another), to conceptual explication. These ideas were developed at great
length in Carnap’s magisterial Logical Foundations of Probability [1950], probabil-
ities being assigned to sentences in a formal language. In his later work Carnap
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in favor of events or propositions, which he regarded as essentially equivalent, and
we shall adopt this viewpoint. (The main technical complication in working at the
level of sentences is that more than one sentence can assert the same proposition;
for example, α ∧ β and ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β).)
Carnap’s approach was a direct descendant of Wittgenstein’s relatively brief
remarks on probability in the Tractatus, later developed at some length by Wais-
mann [1930]. Carnap, following Waismann, assumed the existence of a regular
measure function m(x) on sentences, deﬁning these by ﬁrst assuming a normal-
ized nonnegative function on molecular sentences and then extending these to all
sentences. Carnap then deﬁned in the usual way c(h,e), the conditional probability
of a proposition h given the proposition e, as the ratio m(h ∧ e)/m(e).
Carnap interpreted the conditional probabilities c(h,e) as a measure of the
extent to which evidence e conﬁrms hypothesis h. Such functions had already
been studied by Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum [1940] a decade earlier. Unlike
Carnap, Hosiasson-Lindenbaum took a purely axiomatic approach: she studied
the general properties of conﬁrmation functions c(h,e), assuming only that they
satisﬁed a basic set of axioms. There are several equivalent versions of this set
appearing in the literature; here is one particularly natural formulation:
The axioms of conﬁrmation
1. 0 ≤ c(h,e) ≤ 1.
2. If h ↔ h0 and e ↔ e0, then c(h,e) = c(h0,e0).
3. If e → h, then c(h,e) = 1.
4. If e → ¬(h ∧ h0), then c(h ∨ h0,e) = c(h,e) + c(h0,e).
5. c(h ∧ h0,e) = c(h,e) · c(h0,h ∧ e).
Carnap’s conditional probabilities c(h,e) satisﬁed these axioms (and so were plau-
sible candidates for conﬁrmation functions).
2.2 Betting odds and Dutch books
But just what do the numbers m(e) or c(h,e) represent? It was one of the great
contributions of Ramsey and de Finetti to advance operational deﬁnitions of sub-
jective probability; for Ramsey, primarily as arising from preferences, for de Finetti
as fair odds in a bet. By then imposing rationality criteria on such quantities, both
were able to derive the standard axioms for ﬁnitely additive probability. Ramsey,
in a remarkable tour-de-force, was able to demonstrate the simultaneous existence
of utility and probability functions u(x) and p(x). He did this by imposing natural
consistency constraints on a (suﬃciently rich) set of preferences, introducing the
device of the ethically neutral proposition (the philosophical equivalent of toss-
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functions u(x) and p(x) track one’s preferences in the sense that one action is
preferred to another if and only if its expected utility is greater than the other.
(Jeﬀrey [1983] discusses Ramsey’s system and presents an extremely interesting
variant of it.)
De Finetti, in contrast, initially gave primacy to probabilities interpreted as
betting odds. (If p is a probability, then the corresponding odds are p/(1 − p).)
The odds represent a bet either side of which one is willing to take. (Thus, the odds
of 2 : 1 in favor of an event means that one would accept either a bet of 2 : 1 for,
or a bet of 1 : 2 against. This is somewhat akin to the algorithm for two children
dividing a cake: one divides the cake into two pieces, the other chooses one of the
two pieces.) De Finetti imposed as his rationality constraint the requirement that
these odds be coherent; that is, that it be impossible to construct a Dutch book out
of them. (In a Dutch book, an opponent can choose a portfolio of bets such that
he is assured of winning money. The existence of a Dutch book is analogous to
the existence of arbitrage opportunities in the derivatives market.) A conditional
probability P(A | B) in de Finetti’s system is interpreted as a conditional bet on
A, available only if B is determined to have happened. De Finetti was able to
show that the probabilities corresponding to a coherent set of bettings odds must
satisfy the standard axioms of ﬁnitely additive probability. For example, if one
takes the axioms for conﬁrmation listed in the previous subsection, all are direct
consequences of coherence.
John Kemeny, one of Carnap’s collaborators in the 1950s, proved a beautiful
converse to this result [Kemeny, 1955]. He showed that the above ﬁve properties
of a conﬁrmation function are at once both necessary and suﬃcient for coher-
ence. That is, although de Finetti had in eﬀect shown that coherence implies
the ﬁve axioms, in principle there might be other, incoherent conﬁrmation func-
tions also satisfying the ﬁve axioms. If one did not begin by accepting (coherent)
betting odds as the operational interpretation of c(h,e), this left open the pos-
sibility of other conﬁrmation functions, ones not falling into the Ramsey and de
Finetti framework. The power of Kemeny’s result is that if one accepts the ﬁve
axioms above as necessary desiderata for any conﬁrmation function c(h,e), then
such functions necessarily assign coherent betting odds to the universe of events.
This was a powerful argument in favor of the betting odds interpretation, and it
persuaded Carnap, who adopted it. Thus, while in The Logical Foundations of
Probability Carnap had advanced no fewer than three possible interpretations for
probability1 — evidential support, fair betting quotients, and estimates of statis-
tical frequencies — in his later work he explicitly abandoned the ﬁrst of these, and
wrote almost exclusively in terms of the second. (The “normative” force of Dutch
book arguments has of course been the subject of considerable debate. Armendt
[1993] contains a balanced discussion of the issues and provides a useful entry into
the literature.)
Nevertheless, even accepting the subjective viewpoint, the issue remains: can
the inductive conﬁrmation of hypotheses be understood in quantitative terms? It
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which he turned in a second paper “On inductive logic” [1945a].
3 CONFIRMATION
In order to better appreciate Carnap’s analysis of the inductive process, let us
brieﬂy review the background against which he wrote.
First some basic mathematical probability. Suppose we have an uncertain event
that can have one of two possible outcomes, arbitrarily termed “success” and
“failure”, and let Sn denote the number of successes in n instances (“trials”). If
the trials are independent, and have a constant probability p of success, then the
probability of k successes in the n trials is given by the binomial distribution:
P(Sn = k) =
￿
n
k
￿
pk(1 − p)n−k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
Here ￿
n
k
￿
=
n!
k!(n − k)!
is the binomial coeﬃcient, and n! = n · (n − 1) · (n − 2) ... 3 · 2 · 1.
Suppose next that the probability p is itself random, with some probability
distribution dµ(p) on the unit interval. For example, success and failure might
correspond to getting a head or tail when tossing a ducat, and the ducat is chosen
from a bag of ducats having variable probability p of coming up heads (reﬂecting
the composition of coins in the bag). In this case the probability P(Sn = k) is
obtained by averaging the binomial probabilities over the diﬀerent possible values
of p. This average is standardly given by an integral, namely
P(Sn = k) =
Z 1
0
￿
n
k
￿
pk(1 − p)n−kdµ(p), 0 ≤ k ≤ n,
In our example dµ(p) is aleatory in nature, tied to the composition of the bag.
But it could just as well be taken to be epistemic, reﬂecting our degree of belief
regarding the diﬀerent possible values of p.
3.1 The rule of succession
In this analysis there are several important questions as yet unanswered. In par-
ticular, the nature of p (is it a physical probability or a degree of belief?) has not
been speciﬁed, and no guidance has been given regarding the origin of the initial
or prior distribution dµ(p). In particular, even if the nature of p is speciﬁced, how
does one determine the prior distribution dµ(p)? For Laplace and his school, one
had resort to the principle of indiﬀerence: lacking any reason to favor one value
of p over another, the distribution was taken to be uniform over the unit interval:
dµ(p) = dp. In this case the integral simpliﬁes to give:
P(Sn = k) =
1
n + 1
, 0 ≤ k ≤ n.270 S. L. Zabell
But in fact the Reverend Thomas Bayes, the eponymous founder of the subject
of Bayesian statistics, employed a subtler argument that paralleled Carnap’s later
approach. Bayes [1764] reasoned that in a case of complete ignorance (“an event
concerning the probability of which we absolutely know nothing antecedently to
any trials made concerning it”), one has P(Sn = k) = 1/(n + 1) for all n ≥ 1 and
0 ≤ k ≤ n (in eﬀect Bayes takes the later to be the deﬁnition of the former), and
this in turn implies that the prior must be uniform.
The argument can in fact be made rigorous. Let k = n; then Bayes’s postulate
P(Sn = k) = 1/(n + 1) tells us that
Z 1
0
pndµ(p) =
1
n + 1
=
Z 1
0
pndp, n ≥ 1.
Thus the as yet unknown probability dµ(p) has the same moments as the so-called
“ﬂat” prior dp. But the Hausdorﬀ moment theorem tells us that a probability
measure on a compact set (here [0,1]) is characterized by its moments. Thus
dµ(p) and dp, having the same moments, must coincide.
Given the Bayes-Laplace formula P(Sn = k) = 1/(n+1), it is a simple matter to
derive the corresponding predictive probabilities. If, for example, Xj is a so-called
indicator variable taking the values 1 or 0, depending on whether the outcome of
the j-th trial is a success or failure, respectively (so that the number of successes
Sn is X1 + ... + Xn), then P(Xn+1 = 1 | Sn = k) is the conditional probability of
a success on the next trial, based on the experience of the past n trials. Since the
formula for conditional probability is P(A | B) = P(A and B)/P(B), it follows
after a little algebra that
P(Xn+1 | Sn = k) =
k + 1
n + 2
.
This is the celebrated (or infamous) rule of succession. Both it and the contro-
versial principle of indiﬀerence on which it was based were the subject of harsh
criticism beginning in the middle of the 19th century; see Zabell [1989]. Stigler
[1982] argues that Bayes’s form of the indiﬀerence postulate, applying as it does
to the discrete outcome k, does not entail the same paradoxes as the principle of
indiﬀerence applied to the continuous parameter p. But Bayes’s ingenious argu-
ment was forgotten, and Laplace’s approach became the focus of controversy. The
Cambridge phenom Robert Leslie Ellis objected in the 1840s that one could not
conjure something out of nothing: ex nihilo nihil; the German Johann von Kries
countered in 1886 that one could invoke instead the principle of cogent reason:
alternatives are judged equipossible because our knowledge is distributed equally
among them; the point is the equi-distribution of knowledge rather than nihilist
ignorance. In pragmatic England the Oxford statistician and economist F. Y.
Edgeworth argued the use of ﬂat priors was justiﬁed on approximate empirical
grounds; the Cambridge logician and antiquarian John Venn ridiculed the use of
the rule of succession. In France the distinguished Joseph Bertrand challengedCarnap and the Logic of Inductive Inference 271
the cogency of subjective probability; the even more distinguished Henri Poincar´ e
championed it.
This was the decidedly unsatisfactory state of aﬀairs in 1921, the year when John
Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability appeared. Keynes’s Treatise contains a
useful summary of much of this debate. The next several decades saw increasing
clariﬁcation of the foundations of probability and its use in inductive inference.
But the particular thread we are interested in here involves a curious development
that took place in two independent stages.
4 EXCHANGEABILITY
In 1924 William Ernest Johnson, an English logician and philosopher at King’s
College, Cambridge, published the third volume of his Logic. In an appendix at
the end, Johnson suggested an alternative analysis to the one just discussed, one
which represented a giant step forward. But despite the respect accorded him in
Cambridge, Johnson had only limited inﬂuence outside it, and after his death in
1931, his work was little noted. It is one of the ironies of this subject that Carnap
later followed essentially the same route as Johnson, but to much greater eﬀect, in
part because Carnap’s Logical Foundations of Probability embedded his analysis
in a much more detailed setting, and in part because he continued to reﬁne his
treatment of the subject for nearly two decades (whereas Johnson died only a few
years after the appearance of his book).
Johnson’s analysis contained several elements of novelty. The ﬁrst two of these
were designed to meet the two basic objections that had been raised regarding the
classical rule of succession: its appeal to the so-called “principle of indiﬀerence”,
and its appeal by way of analogy to drawing balls from an urn.
4.1 Multinomial sampling
First, Johnson considered the case of t ≥ 2 equipossible cases (instead of just two).
This was no mere technical generalization. In many of the most telling attacks on
the principle of indiﬀerence, situations were considered where it was unnatural to
think of the outcome of interest as being one of two equipossible competing alter-
natives. By encompassing the multinomial case (several possible categories rather
than just two) Johnson’s analysis applied to situations in which the multiple com-
peting outcomes are either naturally viewed as equipossible (for example, rolling
a fair, six-sided die), or can be further broken down into equipossible subcases.
4.2 The permutation postulate
Second, Johnson presciently introduced the concept of exchangeability. Let us
consider a sequence of random outcomes X1,...,Xn, each taking on one of t possible
types c1,...,ct. (For example, you are on the Starship Enterprise, and each time272 S. L. Zabell
you encounter someone, they are either Klingon, Romulan, or Vulcan, so that
t = 3.) Then a typical probability of interest is of the form
P(X1 = e1,X2 = e2,...,Xn = en), ei ∈ {c1,...,ct}, 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
In the classical inductive setting, the order of these observations is irrelevent,
the only thing that matters being the counts or frequencies observed for each of
the t categories. (More complex situtations will be discussed later.) Thus, if ni
is the number of Xj falling into the i-th category, it is natural to assume that
all sequences X1 = e1,X2 = e2,...,Xn = en having the same frequency counts
n1,n2,...,nt have the same probability. Johnson termed this assumption the per-
mutation postulate. (Carnap called the sequences e1,...,en state descriptions, the
frequency counts n1,...,nt structure descriptions, and made the identical symme-
try assumption.)
The valid application of the rule of succession presupposes, as Boole notes, the
aptness of the analogy between drawing balls from an urn — the urn of nature,
as it was later called — and observing an event [Boole 1854, p. 369]. As Jevons
[1874, p. 150] put it, “nature is to us like an inﬁnite ballot-box, the contents of
which are being continually drawn, ball after ball, and exhibited to us. Science
is but the careful observation of the succession in which balls of various character
present themselves ...”.
The importance of Johnson’s “permutation postulate” is that it is no longer
necessary to refer to the urn of nature. To what extent is observing instances
like drawing balls from an urn? Answer: to the extent that the instances are
judged exchangeable. Venn and others, having attacked the rote use of the rule
of succession, rightly argued that some additional assumption, other than mere
repetition of instances, was necessary for valid inductive inference. From time to
time various names for such a principle have been advanced: Mill’s “Uniformity of
Nature”; Keynes’s “Principle of Limited Variety”; Goodman’s “projectibility”. It
was Johnson’s achievement to have realized both that ‘the calculus of probability
does not enable us to infer any probability-value unless we have some probabilities
or probability relations given’ [Johnson, 1924, p. 182]; and that the vague, verbal
formulations of his predecessors could be captured in the mathematically precise
formulation of exchangeability.
The permutation postulate (the assumption of exchangeability in modern par-
lance) was later independently introduced by the Italian Bruno de Finetti (see,
for example, [de Finetti, 1937]), and became a centerpiece of his theory. For our
purposes here, the basic point is that if the sequence is assumed to be exchange-
able, then an assignment of probabilities to sequences of outcomes e1,e2,...,en re-
duces to assigning probabilities P(n1,n2,...,nt) to sequences of frequency counts
n1,n2,...,nt. This is because there are (using the standard notation for the multi-
nomial coeﬃcient)
￿
n
n1 n2 ... nt
￿
=
n!
n1!n2!...nt!Carnap and the Logic of Inductive Inference 273
diﬀerent possible sequences e1,e2,...,en having the same set of frequency counts
n1,n2,...,nt, and each of these is assumd to be equally likely, so by exchangeability
and the additivity of probability
P(n1,n2,...,nt) =
￿
n!
n1!n2!...nt!
￿
P(e1,e2,...,en).
(That is, the probability of a state description e1,...,en, times the number of state
descriptions having the same corresponding structure description n1,...,nt, gives
the probability of that structure description.)
It is a simple but nevertheless instructive exercise to verify that the predictive
probabilities in this case take on a simple form:
P(Xn+1 = ci | X1 = e1,X2 = e2,...,Xn = en) = P(Xn+1 = ci | n1,n2,...,nt).
(That is, although the conditional probability apparently depends on the entire
state description e1,...,en, in fact it only depends on the corresponding structure
description n1,...,nt.)
In statistical parlance this last property is summarized by saying that the fre-
quencies n1,...,nt are suﬃcient statistics: no information is lost in summarizing
the sequence e1,...,en by the counts n1,...,nt. Such statistics turn out to be a
powerful tool in extensions of exchangeability discovered in recent decades; see,
e.g., [Diaconis and Freedman, 1984].
4.3 The combination postulate
But what do we choose for P(n1,n2,...,nt)? In the case t = 2, this reduces to
assigning probabilities to the pairs (n1,n2). A little thought will show that Bayes’s
postulate (that the diﬀerent possible frequencies k are equally likely) is equivalent
to assuming that the diﬀerent pairs (n1,n2) are equally likely (since n1 = k,n2 =
n−n1 and n is ﬁxed). This in turn suggests the probability assignment that takes
each of the possible structure descriptions to be equally likely, and this is in fact
the path that both Johnson and Carnap initially took (Johnson termed this the
combination postulate). Since there are
￿
n + t − 1
t
￿
possible structure descriptions (also known as “ordered t-partitions of n”, a well-
known combinatorial fact, see, e.g., [Feller, 1968, p. 38]), and each of these is
assumed equally likely, one has
P(n1,n2,...,nt) =
1
￿
n + t − 1
t
￿.274 S. L. Zabell
Together, the combination and permutation postulates uniquely determine the
probability of any speciﬁc ﬁnite sequence; if a state description e1,e2,...,en has
structure description n1,n2,...,nt then its probability is
P(e1,e2,...,en) =
1
￿
n + t − 1
t
￿￿
n
n1 n2 ... nt
￿;
see Johnson [1924, appendix on eduction]. This is Carnap’s m? function.
Having thus speciﬁed the probabilities of the “atomic” sequences, all other
probabilities, including the rules of succession, are completely determined. Some
simple algebra in fact yields
P(Xn+1 = ci | n1,n2,...,nt) =
ni + 1
n + t
;
see Johnson [1924]. This is Carnap’s c? function.
5 THE CONTINUUM OF INDUCTIVE METHODS
Although the mathematics of the derivation of the c? system is certainly attrac-
tive, its assumption that all structure descriptions are equally likely is hardly
compelling, and Carnap soon turned to more general systems.
It is ironic that here too his line of attack very closely paralleled that of John-
son. After criticisms from C. D. Broad [1924] and others, Johnson devised a more
general postulate, later termed by I. J. Good [1965] the suﬃcientness postulate.
This assumes that the predictive probabilities for a particular type i are a func-
tion of how many observations of the type have been seen already (ni), and the
total sample size n. It is a remarkable fact that this characterizes the predictive
probabilities or rules of succession (and therefore the probability of any sequence).
5.1 The Johnson-Carnap continuum
Suppose X1,X2,...,Xn,... represent an inﬁnite sequence of observations, each as-
suming one of (the same) t possible values, and that at each stage n the sequence
satisﬁes the permutation postulate. (In modern parlance, one has an inﬁnitely ex-
changeable, t-valued sequence of random variables.) Assume the sequence satisﬁes
the following three conditions:
1. Any state description e,...,en is a priori possible: P(e1,...en) > 0.
2. The “suﬃcientness postulate” is satisﬁed:
P(Xn+1 = ei | n1,...,nt) = fi(ni,n).
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Then (unless the outcomes are independent of each other, so that observing
one or more provides no predictive power regarding the others) the predictive
probabilities have a very special form: there exist positive constants α1,...,αt such
that if α = α1 + ... + αt, then for all n ≥ 1, states ei, and structure descriptions
n1,...,nt,
P(Xn+1 = ei | n1,...,nt) =
ni + αi
n + α
.
This truly beautiful result characterizes the predictive probabilities up to a
ﬁnite sequence of positive constants α1,α2,...,αt. Note Carnap’s c? measure of
conﬁrmation is a special case of the continuum, with αi = 1 for all i.
The assumption that all state descriptions have positive probability is needed
to insure that the requisite conditional probabilities are well-deﬁned. (In Carnap’s
terminology, the probability function is regular.) The restriction t ≥ 3 is neces-
sary because otherwise the suﬃcientness postulate would be vacuous. (One can
recover the result in the case t = 2 by replacing the suﬃcientness postulate by
the assumption that the predictive probabilities are linear in ni; see, e.g., [Zabell,
1982].)
5.2 The de Finetti representation theorem
The assumption that arbitrarily long sequences satisfy the permutation postulate
means their probabilities admit an integral representation of the type mentioned
earlier in Section 3; this is the content of the celebrated de Finetti representation
theorem [de Finetti, 1937]. Speciﬁcally, let ∆t denote the set of probabilities on t
elements:
∆t := {(p1,...,pt) : pj ≥ 0,
t X
j=1
pj = 1}.
De Finetti’s theorem states that if X1,X2,X3,... is an inﬁnitely exchangeable
sequence on t elements, then there exists a probability measure dµ on ∆t, such
that for every n ≥ 1, if n1,...,nt are the frequency counts of X1,...,Xn, then
P(n1,n2,...,nt) =
Z
∆t
n!
n1!n2!...nt!
p
n1
1 p
n2
2 ...pnt
n dµ(p1,...,pt).
(Note that a single measure dµ simultaneously achieves this for all sample sizes
n.)
There are a number of interesting foundational issues arising from this result.
The integrand
n!
n1!n2!...nt!
p
n1
1 p
n2
2 ...pnt
n
is a multinomial probability, and the theorem asserts that an exchangeable prob-
ability P can be represented as a integral mixture of multinomial probabilities.
It is obvious that a multinomial probability and more generally any mixture of
multinomials is exchangeable; the force of the theorem is that the converse holds:276 S. L. Zabell
every exchangeable probability is expressible as a mixture. There is no restriction
placed on the mixing measure dµ.
Many results in the literature of inductive inference are often easier to state,
prove, or interpret in terms of such representations. For example, Johnson’s the-
orem can be interpreted as telling us that when the suﬃcientness postulate is
satisﬁed the averaging measure in the representation is a member of the classical
Dirichlet family of prior distributions:
dµ(p1,...,pt) =
Γ(
Pt
j=1 αj)
Qt
j=1 Γ(αj)
t Y
j=1
p
αj−1
j dp1...dpt−1 (αj > 0).
(Here Γ denotes the gamma function; if k is a positive integer, then Γ(k) = (k−1)!.)
The ability to characterize the predictive probabilities using Johnson’s suﬃcient-
ness postulate, however, means that in principle one can entirely pass over this
interesting but more mathematically complex fact. As Johnson himself observed,
I substitute, for the mathematician’s use of Gamma Functions and α-
multiple integrals, a comparatively simple piece of algebra, and thus
deduce a formula similar to the mathematician’s, except that, instead
of for two, my theorem holds for α alternatives, primarily postulated
as equiprobable. [Johnson, 1932, p. 418; Johnson’s α corresponds to
our t]
Why are rules of succession so important? Note the joint probability of a
sequence of events can be built up from the corresponding sequence of conditional
probabilities. For example: the joint probability
P(X1 = e1,X2 = e2,X3 = e3)
can be expressed as
P(X1 = e1) · P(X2 = e2 | X1 = e1) · P(X3 = e3 | X1 = e1,X2 = e2).
Thus one can express joint probabilities in terms of initial probabilities and rules
of succession.
5.3 Interpretation of the Continuum
Let us consider a speciﬁc method in the continuum, say with parameters α1,...,αt.
Then one can write the rule of succession as
P(Xn+1 = ci | ni) =
ni + αi
n + α
=
￿
n
n + α
￿hni
n
i
+
￿
α
n + α
￿hαi
α
i
.
The two expressions in square brackets have obvious interpretations: the ﬁrst,
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αi/α, is our initial or prior probability concerning the likelihood of seeing ci (set
ni = n = 0 in the formula). The two terms in rounded brackets, n/(n + α) and
α/(n+α), sum to one and express the relative weight accorded to our observations
versus our prior information. If α is small, then n/(n+α) is close to one, and the
empirical frequencies ni/n are accorded primacy; if α is large, then n/(n + α) is
small, and the initial probabilties are accorded primacy.
Of course, “if α is large” must be understood relative to a ﬁxed value of n; no
matter how large α is, for a ﬁxed value of α it is evident that
lim
n→∞
n
n + α
= 1,
reﬂecting the fact that no matter how large the initial weight assigned to our initial
probabilities, these prior opinions are ultimately swamped by the overwhelming
weight of empirical evidence.
5.4 History
The result itself has an interesting history. Johnson considered the special case
when the function fi(ni,n) = f(ni,n); that is, it does not depend on the category
or type i. In this case there is just one parameter, α, since αi = α/t for all i.
Johnson did not publish his result in his own lifetime (shades of Bernoulli and
Bayes!); he had planned a fourth volume of his Logic, but only completed drafts of
three chapters of it at the time of his death. A (then very young) R. B. Braithwaite
edited the chapters for publication, and they appeared as three separate articles
in Mind in 1932 [Johnson, 1932]. (It is ironic that G. E. Moore, the editor of
Mind, questioned the desirability of including a mathematical appendix giving the
details of the proof in such a journal, but Braithwaite — fortunately — insisted.)
Due to its posthumous character, the proof as published contained a few lacunae,
and a desire to ﬁll these led to [Zabell, 1982]. This paper shows that not only can
the above-mentioned lacunae be ﬁlled, but that Johnson’s method very naturally
generalizes to cover the asymmetric case (when the predictive function fi(ni,n)
depends on i), the case t = ∞, and the case of ﬁnite exchangeable sequences that
are not inﬁnitely extendable.
Carnap followed much the same path as Johnson, initially considering the sym-
metric, category independent case, except that he assumed both the suﬃcientness
postulate and the form of the predictive probabilities given in the theorem. It was
only later that his collaborator John G. Kemeny was able to prove the equivalence
of the two (assuming t > 2). Carnap subsequently extended these results, ﬁrst to
cover the case t = 2 [Carnap and Stegm¨ uller, 1959]; and ﬁnally in Jeﬀrey (1980,
Chapter 6) abandoned the assumption of symmetry between categories and de-
rived the full result given above (see also [Kuipers, 1978]). The historical evolution
is traced in [Schillp, 1963, pp. 74–75 and 979–980; Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971, pp.
1–4 and 223; Jeﬀrey, 1980, pp. 1–5 and 103–104].278 S. L. Zabell
6 CONFIRMATION OF UNIVERSAL GENERALIZATIONS
Suppose all n observations are of the same type; for example, that we are observing
crows and thus far all have been black. In such situtations, it is natural to view
our experience as evidence not just that most crows are black, but as conﬁrming
the “universal generalization” that all crows are black. This apparently natural
expectation, however, leads to unexpected complexities.
6.1 Paradox feigned
This is due to an interesting property of the Johnson-Carnap continuum: (inﬁnite)
universal generalizations have zero probability! For example, having observed n
black crows, it follows from k successive applications of the rule of succession that
the probability the next k crows are also black is
P(Xn+1 = Xn+2 = ... = Xn+k = ci | ni = n) =
n+k−1 Y
j=n
j + αi
j + α
.
It is not hard to see that this product tends to zero as k tends to inﬁnity. It is
a standard result that if 0 < an ≤ 1(n ≥ 1) then the inﬁnite product
Q
n≥1 an)
diverges to zero if and only if the corresponding inﬁnite series
P
n≥1(1 − an)
diverges to inﬁnity (see, e.g., [Knopp, 1947, pp. 218-221]). Because
∞ X
j=n
α − αi
j + α
diverges (it is essentially the harmonic series), one has
lim
k→∞
n+k−1 Y
j=n
j + αi
j + α
= 0.
This was viewed as a defect of Carnap’s system by several critics, for example,
[Barker, 1957, pp. 87-88; Ayer, 1972, pp. 37-38, 80-81]. But the phenomenon itself
had been both noted and defended much earlier, by Augustus De Morgan [1838, p.
128] in the nineteenth century. (“No ﬁnite experience whatsoever can justify us in
saying that the future shall coincide with the past in all time to come, or that there
is any probability for such a conclusion”); and by C. D. Broad [1918] in a similar
situation (the “ﬁnite rule of succession”) in the twentieth. The obvious Bayesian
response was advanced by Wrinch and Jeﬀreys [1919] a year after Broad wrote:
one assigns non-zero initial probability to the generalization. As Edgeworth noted
shortly after in his review of Keyens’s Treatise, “pure induction avails not without
some ﬁnite initial probability in favour of the generalisation, obtained from some
other source than the instances examined” [Edgeworth 1922, p. 267].
But can one build such a “ﬁnite initial probability” into the Carnapian approach
(that is, via axiomatic characterization)? In order to understand this, let us ﬁrst
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6.2 Paradox lost
It is possible to see what is going wrong in terms of the suﬃcientness postulate.
Suppose there are three categories, 1, 2, and 3, and none of the observations thus
far fall into the ﬁrst. What can one say about
P(X2n+1 = c1 | n1,n2,n3)?
According to the suﬃcientness postulate, there is no diﬀerence between the three
cases (a) n2 = 2n, n3 = 0, (b) n2 = 0, n3 = 2n, and (c) n2 = n3 = n. But from
the point of universal generalizations there is an obvious diﬀerence: the ﬁrst and
second cases conﬁrm diﬀerent universal generalizations (which may have diﬀerent
initial probabilities), while the third case disconﬁrms both. Continua conﬁrming
universal generalizations must treat the cases diﬀerently.
Thus it is necessary to relax the suﬃcientness postulate, at least in the case
when ni = n for some i. This diagnosis suggests a simple remedy. Suppose
one modiﬁes the suﬃcientness postulate so that the “representative functions”
fi(n1,...,nt) (to use yet another terminology sometimes employed) are assumed to
be functions of ni and n unless ni = 0 and nj = n for some j 6= i. Then it can be
shown (see, e.g., [Zabell, 1996]) that as long the observations are exclusively of one
type, the representative function consists of two parts: a term corresponding to
the posterior probability that future observations will continue to be of this type
(the “universal generalization”), and a Johnson-Carnap term; and this continues
to be the case as long as all observations are of a single type. If, however, at any
stage a second type is observed, then the representative function reverts to a pure
Johnson-Carnap form.
So this was a tempest in a teapot: this criticism of the continuum was easily
answered even at the time it was initially made. In hindsight the reason Johnson’s
postulate gives rise to the problem is apparent, the minimal change to the postulate
necessary to remedy the problem results in an expanded continuum conﬁrming
precisely the desired universal generalizations (and no others), and this can be
demonstrated by a straightfoward modiﬁcation of Johnson’s original proof (for
further discussion and references, see [Zabell, 1996]).
But in fact much more is true: such an extension of the original Carnap contin-
uum is merely a special case of a much richer class of extensions due to Hintikka,
Niiniluoto, and Kuipers.
6.3 Hintikka-Niiniluoto systems
In order to appreciate Hintikka’s contribution, consider ﬁrst the category symmet-
ric case. Let Tn(X1,X2,...,Xn) denote the number of distinct types or species
observed in the sample. In the continuum discussed in the previous subsection
the predictive probabilities now depend not just on ni and n, but also on Tn, the
number of instantiated categories. Speciﬁcally: is Tn = 1 or is Tn > 1? Thus
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function of ni,n, and Tn. The result is a very attractive extension of the Carnap
continuum.
In brief, if the predictive probabilities depend on Tn, then in general they arise
from mixtures of Johnson-Carnap continua concentrated on subsets of the possible
types. Thus, given three categories a,b,c, the probabilities can be concentrated
on a or b or c (universal generalizations), or Johnson-Carnap continua correspond-
ing to the three pairs (a,b),(a,c),(b,c), or a Johnson-Carnap continuum on all
three. In retrospect, this is of course quite natural. If only two of the three pos-
sibilities are observed in a long sequence of observations (say a and b), then (in
addition to giving us information about the relative frequency of a and b) this
tentatively conﬁrms the initial hypothesis that only a’s and b’s will occur. In the
more general category asymmetric case, the initial probabilities for the six diﬀerent
generalizations (a, b, c, ab, ac, and bc) can diﬀer, and the predictive probabilities
are postulated to be functions of ni,n, and the observed constituent: that is, the
speciﬁc set of categories observed. (Thus in our example it is not enough to tell
one that Tn = 2, but which two categories or species have been observed.)
This beautiful circle of results originates with Hintikka [1966], and was later
extended by Hintikka and Niiniluoto [1979]. The monograph by Kuipers [1978]
gives an outstanding survey and synthesis of this work, including discussion of
Kuipers’s own contributions; for a recent summary and evaluation, see Niiniluoto
[2009].
6.4 Attribute symmetry
Both the original Johnson-Carnap continuum and its Hintikka-Niiniluoto-Kuipers
generalizations are of great interest, but share a common weakness. If what one
is trying to do is to capture precisely the notion of a category-symmetric state of
knowledge – no more and no less — then the one and only constraint is that the
resulting probabilities be invariant under permutation of the categories. Carnap
referred to such invariance as attribute symmetry. If one writes an n-long sequence
in compact form as
X : {1,...,n} → {1,...,t},
and P is a probability on the possible sequences X, then exchangeability requires
P to be invariant under permutations of {1,...,n} and attribute symmetry requires
P to be invariant under permutations of {1,...,t}.
Suppose one adds attribute symmetry to exchangeability as a restriction on P.
The resulting class of probability functions is still inﬁnite dimensional; see Zabell
[1982, p. 1097, 1992; pp. 216–217]. At ﬁrst sight this seems surprising: if our
knowledge is category symmetric, surely the suﬃcientness postulate should hold.
But it is not hard to construct counterexamples. For example, suppose we have a
die and know one face is twice as likely to come up as another, but not which face.
Then there are six hypotheses Hj: for 1 ≤ j ≤ 6, Hj : pj = 2/7,pk = 1/7,k 6= j;
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frequency vectors that could occur in a sample of size n = 70:
n1 = (20,10,10,10,10,10), n2 = (20,30,5,5,5,5).
Obviously n1 supports H1 over H2; and n2 supports H2 over H1, even though, if
the suﬃcientness postulate held, the predictive probabilities for seeing a one on
the next trial should be the same in each case.
So there exist natural category symmetric epistemic states in which the suﬃ-
cientness postulate fails. In general, if there is attribute symmetry the suﬃcient
statistics are the frequencies of the frequencies (denoted ar): for each r,0 ≤ r ≤ t,
ar is the number of categories j such that nj = r. The recognition that even
in these cases the entire list of frequencies ni may contain relevant information
concerning the individual categories via the ar appears to go back to Turing; see
[Good, 1965, Chapter 8].
Thus even assuming both exchangeability and attribute symmetry admits a
rich family of possible probabilities; and it might be thought this would limit
their utility. But even exchangeability by itself has many interesting qualitative
consequences. The next section illustrates one of these.
7 INSTANTIAL RELEVANCE
One important desideratum of a candidate for conﬁrmation is instantial relevance:
if a particular type is observed, then it is more likely that such a type will be
observed in the future. In its simplest form, this is the requirement that if i < j,
then
P(Xj = 1 | Xi = 1) ≥ P(Xj = 1)
(the Xk denoting indicators that take on the values 0 or 1).
It is not hard to see that exchangeability alone does not insure instantial rel-
evance. Suppose, for example, one draws balls at random from an urn initially
having three red balls and two black balls. If the sampling is without replacement,
then the probability of selecting a red ball is initially 3/5, but the probability of
selecting a second red ball, given the ﬁrst is red, is 1/2.
In the past there was a small cottage industry devoted to investigating the
precise circumstances under which the principle of instantial relevance does or
does not hold for a sequence of observations. If the observations in question can be
imbedded in an inﬁnitely exchangeable sequence (that is, into an inﬁnite sequence
X1,X2,..., any ﬁnite segment X1,...,Xn of which is exchangeable), then instantial
relevance does hold. After the power of the de Finetti representation theorem
was appreciated, very simple proofs of this were discovered (see, e.g., [Carnap and
Jeﬀrey, 1971, Chapters 4 and 5]).
There are also simple ways of seeing this without using the representation the-
orem. For example, the principle of instantial relevance is equivalent to the as-
sertion that the observations are nonnegatively correlated. If X1,X2,...,Xn is an282 S. L. Zabell
exchangeable sequence of random variables, then an elementary argument shows
that the correlation coeﬃcient ρ = ρ(Xi,Xj) satisﬁes the simple inequality
ρ ≥ −
1
n − 1
.
This is because (using both the formula for the variance of a sum and the ex-
changeability of the sequence) if σ2 = V ar[Xi], one has
0 ≤ V ar[X1 + ... + Xn] = nσ2 + n(n − 1)ρσ2.
Thus, if the sequence can be indeﬁnitely extended (so that one can pass to the
limit n → ∞), it follows that ρ ≥ 0. The case ρ = 0 then corresponds to the
case of independence (the past conveys no information about the future, inductive
inference is impossible); and the case ρ > 0 corresponds to inductive inference and
positive instantial relevance.
8 FINITE EXCHANGEABILITY
In the end, inﬁnite sequences are really just ﬁctions, so we would rather not incor-
porate them into our Weltanschauung in an essential way. In this section we take
a closer look at this question.
8.1 Extendability
The de Finetti representation only holds for an inﬁnite sequences; it is easy to
construct counterexamples otherwise. Consider, for example, the exchangeable
assignment
P(RB) = P(BR) =
1
2
; P(RR) = P(BB) = 0.
This corresponds to sampling without replacement from an urn containing one red
ball (R) and one black ball (B). This exchangeable probability assignment on
ordered pairs cannot be extended to one on ordered triples. To see this, suppose
otherwise. Then
P(RBR) + P(RBB) = P(RB) =
1
2
,
so either P(RBR) > 0 or P(RBB) > 0 (or both). Suppose without loss of
generality that P(RBR) > 0. Then
P(RR) ≥ P(RRB) = P(RBR) > 0
(the ﬁrst inequality follows because probabilities are subadditive, that is, if A ⊆ B,
then P(A) ≤ P(B); the equality because P is by assumption exchangeable). But
this is impossible, since P(RR) = 0. (It is not hard to see this is typical: sampling
without replacement from a ﬁnite population results in an exchangeable probability
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In general, if X1,X2,...,Xn is an exchangeable sequence, then it may or may not
be possible to extend it to a longer exchangeable sequence X1,X2,...,Xn,...,Xn+r,
r ≥ 1. If it is possible to do so for every r ≥ 1, then we can think of X1,X2,...,Xn
as the initial sequence of an inﬁnitely exchangeable sequence X1,X2,X3,... (thanks
to the Kolmogorov existence theorem). Thus the de Finetti representation theorem
applies, the inﬁnite sequence can be represented as a mixture of iid (independent
and identically distributed) sequences, and hence a fortiori the initial segment of
length n can be so represented.
On the other hand, if a ﬁnite exchangeable sequence of length n has a represen-
tation as a mixture of iid sequences, it is immediate that it is inﬁnitely extendable.
Thus:
A ﬁnite exchangeable sequence is inﬁnitely extendable if and only if it
is representable as a mixture of iid sequences.
To summarize: in general a ﬁnite exchangeable sequence may or may not be
extendable. Carnap alludes to this fact when he reports that while at the Institute
for Advanced Studies in 1952–1953, he and his collaborator John Kemeny
had talks with L. J. Savage. Among other things, Savage showed them
that the use of a language LN with a ﬁnite number of individuals is
not advisable, because a symmetric M-function in LN cannot always
be extended to an M-function in a language with a greater number of
individuals. [Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971, p. 3]
Note the curious phrase “not advisable”. It is unclear why Savage thought this
(if indeed he did): recall sampling without replacement from a ﬁnite population
results in a perfectly respectable exchangeable assignment even though it cannot
be extended. More generally think of any population which is naturally ﬁnite in
extent, and to which we wish to extrapolate on the basis of a partial sample from it.
(For example, think of a limited edition of a book, and whether or not such books
are defective.) The phenomenon of non-extendability is no sense pathological.
Or course there is a price to pay: the loss of the de Finetti representation. Or
is there?
8.2 The ﬁnite representation theorem
Given a set of counts n = (n1,...,nt), imagine an urn containing nj balls of each
type, and suppose one successively draws out “at random” without replacement
each ball in the urn (“at random” meaning that all possible sequences are judged
equally likely). There are a total of (n1 + + nt)!/(n1!...nt!) such sequences; the
exchangeable probability assignment Hn giving each of these equal probability is
called the hypergeometric distribution. If, more generally, X1,,Xn is any exchange-
able sequence whatsoever, and P(n) the corresponding probability assignment on
the set of counts n, then the overall probability assignment P on the set of se-
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P(n); compactly this can be expressed as
P =
X
n
P(n)Hn.
This result is the ﬁnite de Finetti representation theorem. It is basically just the
so-called “theorem of total probability” in disguise. It tells us that the structure
of the generic ﬁnite exchangeable sequence is really quite simple. If the sequence
is N long, and the outcomes can be of t diﬀerent types, then you can think of it as
a sequence of draws from an urn with N balls, each of which can be one of the t
types, but the distribution of types of among the N balls (the n) is unknown. If (as
the Spartans would say), you knew the distribution of types, then your probability
assignment would be the appropriate hypergeometric distribution. But since you
don’t, you assign a prior distribution to n and then average.
Although the ﬁnite representation theorem is not quite as well known (or appre-
ciated) as its big brother, the representation theorem for an inﬁnite exchangeable
sequence, it would be a serious mistake to underestimate it. To begin, thanks
to the representation, there is a drastic reduction in the number of independent
probabilities to be speciﬁed; in the case of tossing a coin 10 times, for example,
from 210 − 1 = 1023 to 11.
But there are also important conceptual and philosophical advantages to think-
ing in terms of the ﬁnite representation theorem.
8.3 The ﬁnite rule of succession
The classical rule of succession, that if in n trials there are k successes, then the
probability of a success on the next trial is (k+1)/(n+2), assumes you are sampling
from an inﬁnite population (see [Laplace, 1774]). (Strictly speaking the last makes
no sense, but it can be viewed as a shorthand for either sampling with replacement
(so that the population remains unaltered by the sampling) or as passing to the
limit in the case case of sampling from a ﬁnite population.) In particular, if all
n are of the same type, then the probability that the next is also of this type is
(n + 1)/(n + 2).
But it is clear that the basic relevant question is a diﬀerent one: the probability if
you are sampling without replacement from a ﬁnite population. This question was
ﬁrst asked and answered by Prevost and L’Huilier [1799]. To answer the question,
of course, one must make some assumption regarding the composition of the urn
(that is, adopt some set of prior probabilities regarding the diﬀerent possible urn
compositions). The natural assumption, parallel to the Bayes-Laplace analysis,
is to assume all possible vectors of counts are equally likely. Doing this, Prevost
and L’Huilier were able to ﬁrst derive the posterior probabilities for the diﬀerent
urn constitutions of the urn; and then from this derive the rule of succession as
a consequence, the ﬁnal result being that (given p successes out of m to date)
the probability of a success on the next trial is (p + 1)/(m + 2), exactly the same
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This result was subsequently independently rediscovered several times over the
next century and a quarter, the last being by C. D. Broad in 1918, when it ﬁnally
gained some traction in philosophical circles (see generally [Zabell, 1988]). The
brute force mathematical derivation of this particular rule of succession requires
the evaluation of a tricky combinatorial sum; and its history of successive rediscov-
ery is a phenomenon that is sometimes seen in the mathematical literature when a
result is interesting enough (so that it repeatedly attracts attention), hard enough
(so that it is deemed worthy of publication), and obscure or technical enough (so
that it is then subsequently easily forgotten or overlooked).
But our point here is that this striking coincidence between the ﬁnite and inﬁnite
rules of succession, which, when viewed through the prism of the combinatorial
legerdemain required to evaluate the necessary sum, appears to be a minor miracle,
is in fact obvious when thought of in terms of the ﬁnite representation theorem.
For consider. Suppose X1,X2,... is an inﬁnite exchangeable sequence of 0s and
1s having mixing measure dQ(p) = dp in the de Finetti representation (that is,
the Bayes-Laplace process). If Sn = X1 + ... + Xn denotes the number of 1s in n
trials, then, as noted earlier,
P(Sn = k) =
Z 1
0
￿
n
k
￿
pk(1 − p)n−kdp =
1
n + 1
.
Now consider the initial segment X1,X2,..,Xn by itself. This is a ﬁnite ex-
changeable sequence, and so has a ﬁnite representation in terms of some mixture
of hypergeometric probabilities. But the mixing measure for the ﬁnite represen-
tation in the dichotomous case is P(Sn = k), which is, as just noted, 1/(n + 1),
the Prevost-L’Huilier prior (or, as Jack Good might put it, the Prevost-L’Huilier-
Terrot-Todhunter-Ostrogradskii-Broad prior).
But the ﬁnite representation uniquely determines the stochastic structure of a
ﬁnite exchangeable sequence; thus an n-long Prevost-L’Huiler sequence is stochas-
tically identically to the initial, n-long segment of the Bayes-Laplace process, and
therefore the two coincide in all respects, including (but not limited to) their rules
of succession. No tricky sums!
Viewed from the perspective of the philosophical foundations of inductive infer-
ence the ﬁnite rule of succession is important for two reasons vis-a-vis the classical
Laplacean analysis:
1. It eliminates a variety of possible concerns about the occurrence of the inﬁnite
in the Laplacean analysis (e.g., [Kneale, 1949, p. 205]): that is, attention
is focused on a ﬁnite segment of trials, rather than a hypothetical inﬁnite
sequence or population.
2. The frequency, propensity, or objective chance p that appears in the integral
is replaced by the fraction of successes in a ﬁnite population; thus a purely
personalist or subjective analysis becomes possible and objections to “prob-
abilities of probabilities” or “unknown probabilities” (e.g., [Keynes, 1921,
pp. 372 –75]) are eliminated.286 S. L. Zabell
8.4 The ﬁnite continuum of inductive methods
As one ﬁnal example of both the utility and interest of considering ﬁnite exchange-
able sequences, we note in passing that Johnson’s derivation of the continuum of
inductive methods carries over immediately to the ﬁnite case, the chief element of
novelty being that now the α parameters in the rule of succession can be negative
(since, for example, when sampling without replacement from an urn, the more
balls of a given color one sees, the less likely it becomes to see other balls of the
same color); see [Zabell, 1982].
8.5 The proper role of the inﬁnite
Aristotle (Physics 3.6, see, e.g., [Heath, 1949, pp. 102–113]) distinguishes between
the actual inﬁnite and the potential inﬁnite, a useful distinction to keep in mind
when thinking about the use of the inﬁnite in probability. One might summarize
Aristotle as saying that the use of the inﬁnite is only appropriate in its potential
rather than actual sense. Let us apply this to the case of probability: theories
that depend in an essential way on the actual inﬁnite are fatally ﬂawed. Consider
von Mises’s frequency theory. In any theory of physical probability, if 0 < p < 1 is
the probability of an outcome in a sequence of independent trials, then any ﬁnite
frequency k in n trials has a positive probability. Thus any observed value of k is
consistent with any possible value of p. In von Mises’s theory in order to achieve
this consistency of any p with any k, it is essential that p be an inﬁnite limiting
frequency. But, being inﬁnite in nature, p is unobservable, hence metaphysical (in
the pejorative sense); see, e.g., [Jeﬀrey, 1977].
But, one might object, doesn’t the inﬁnite representation theorem also suﬀer
from this defect, since it holds just for inﬁnitely exchangeable sequences (rather
than ﬁnitely exchangeable sequences, the only things we really see)? The answer is
no, if one correctly understands it from both a mathematical and a philosophical
standpoint.
Mathematical interpretation of the representation theorem
In applied mathematics one frequently uses inﬁnite limit theorems as approxima-
tions to the large but ﬁnite. That is, the sequence, although of course necessarily
ﬁnite, is viewed as eﬀectively unlimited in length. (So, for example, in tossing a
coin, there is no practical limit to how many times we can toss it, although it will
certainly wear down after many googles of tosses.)
But the applied mathematician must also have some idea of when to use a limit
theorem as an approximation and when not. This is the reason the central limit
theorem (CLT) is is of practical use, but the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL)
is not: the CLT provides an excellent approximation to sums of random variables
for surprisingly small sample sizes; the LIL only for surprisingly large.
What this ultimately means is that what the applied mathematician needs is
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not just the limiting value but the rate of convergence to that limit. Happily
such a result is available for the de Finetti representation theorem, thanks to Persi
Diaconis and David Freedman [1980a].
First some notation: if S is a set, let Sn denote its n-fold Cartesian product
(n ≤ ∞). If p is a probability on S, let pn denote the corresponding n-fold product
probability on Sn (corresponding to an n-long, p-iid sequence). If P is a probability
on Sn, then Pk denotes its restriction to Sk, k ≤ n. If Θ parametrizes the set
of probabilities on S and µ is a a probability on Θ (to be thought of as a mixing
measure), let Pµn denote the resulting exchangeable probability on Sn; that is
Pµn =
Z
Θ
pn
θ dµ(θ).
Finally, if P and Q are probabilities on Sn, let
||P − Q|| = max
A⊂Sn |P(A) − Q(A)|
denote the variation distance between P and Q.
Then one has the following result: Suppose S is a ﬁnite set of cardinality t and
P is an exchangeable probability on Sn. Then there exists a probability µ on the
Borel sets of Θ and a constant c such that
||Pk − Pµk|| =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Pk −
Z
pn
θ dµ(θ)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ≤
2tk
n
for all k ≤ n.
This beautiful result has a number of interesting consequences. First, it makes
precise the interrelationship between extendability and the existence of an inte-
gral representation. Given an exchangeable sequence of length k, if the sequence
is extendable to a longer sequence of length n, then it can be approximated by an
integral mixture to order k/n in variation distance. The more the sequence can
be extended, the more it looks like an integral mixture. Thus it is not surprising
(and Diaconis and Freedman in fact use the above theorem to prove) that a se-
quence which can be extended indeﬁnitely (equivalently, is the initial segment of
an inﬁnitely exchangeable sequence) has an integral representation.
But the theorem also tells us how to think about the application of the repre-
sentation theorem. Given a sequence that is the initial segment of a “potentially
inﬁnite” sequence (that is, unbounded in any practical sense), thinking of it as an
integral mixture is a reasonable approximate procedure (in just the same way as
summarizing a population of heights in terms of a normal distribution is a rea-
sonable approximation to an ultimately discrete underlying reality). For a very
readable discussion of this topic, see [Diaconis, 1977].
Philosophical interpretation of the representation theorem
From this perspective the representation is a tool used for mathematical approxi-
mation. The “parameter” p is a purely mathematical object, not a physical quan-
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to stick to the ﬁrm and unexceptionable interpretation that the limit distribution
is merely the asymptotic expression of frequencies in a large, but ﬁnite, number
of trials” [de Finetti, 1972, p. 216].
De Finetti was a ﬁnitist who rejected the use of countable additivity in prob-
ability as lacking a philosophical justiﬁcation. (It is not a consequence of the
usual Dutch book argument.) In particular, de Finetti’s statement and proof of
the representation theorem uses only ﬁnitely additive probability. See Cifarelli
and Regazzini [1996] for an outstanding discussion of the role of the inﬁnite in de
Finetti’s papers.
9 THE FIRST INDUCTION THEOREM
There is a very interesting result, which Good [1975, p. 62] terms the ﬁrst induction
theorem. Its interest is that it makes no reference at all to exchangeability, and yet
it provides an account of enumerative induction, in that it tells us that conﬁrming
instances (in a sense to be made precise in a moment) increase the probability of
other potential instances. To be precise, if P(H) > 0 and P(Ej|H) = 1,j ≥ 1 (the
Ej are “implications” of H), then (E1E2 denoting the conjunction of E1 and E2,
and so on),
lim
n→∞P(En+1En+2...En+m
￿ ￿E1E2...En) = 1
uniformly in m. The proof (due to [Huzurbazar, 1955]) is at once simple and
elegant. Just note that for any n ≥ 1, one has P(E1...En
￿
￿H) = 1, hence
P(E1...En) ≥ P(E1...EnEn+1) ≥ P(E1...EnEn+1H) = P(H) > 0.
It follows that un = P(E1...En) is a decreasing sequence bounded from below by
a positive number, and therefore has a positive limit. Thus
lim
n→∞P(En+1En+2...En+m
￿
￿E1E2...En) = lim
n→∞
un+m
un
= 1;
and it is apparent that the convergence is uniform in m.
The result is not so surprising for sampling from a ﬁnite population, but for a
potentially inﬁnite sequence is at ﬁrst startling. It tells us that observing a suﬃ-
ciently long sequence of conﬁrming instances makes any further ﬁnite sequence, no
matter how long, as close to one as desired. Good [1975, p. 62] says “the kudology
is diﬃcult”, but cites both Keynes [1921, Chapter 20] and Wrinch and Jeﬀreys
[1921]; see also [Jeﬀreys, 1961, pp. 43–44].
10 ANALOGY
Simple enumeration is an important form of inductive inference but there are also
others, based on analogy. Carnap distinguished between two forms of analogy:Carnap and the Logic of Inductive Inference 289
analogy by proximity and analogy by similarity; that is, proximity in time (or
sequence number) and similarity of attribute.
In the case of inductive analogy, Carnap wished to generalize his results, allow-
ing for the possibility that the inductive strength of P varies depending on some
measure of “closeness” of either time or attribute. In the case of attributes this
required the speciﬁcation of a “distance” on the attribute set; in the case of time
such a metric is of course already present. But Carnap only obtained only partial
results in this case (see [Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971, p. 1; Jeﬀrey, 1980, Chapter 6,
Sections 16–18]).
De Finetti and his successors were more successful. De Finetti formulated early
on a concept of partial exchangeability [de Finetti, 1938], diﬀering forms of partial
exchangeability corresponding to diﬀering forms of analogy. He viewed matters in
eﬀect as a spectrum of possibilities; exchangeability representing one extreme, a
limiting case of “absolute” analogy. At the other extreme all one has is Bayes’s
theorem, P(E|A) = P(AE)/P(A); absent “particular hypotheses concerning the
inﬂuence of A on E”, nothing further can be said, “no determinate conclusion can
be deduced”. The challenge was to ﬁnd “other cases ... more general but still
tractable”. For an English translation of de Finetti’s paper, see [Jeﬀrey, 1980,
Chapter 9]. Diaconis and Freedman [Jeﬀrey, 2004, pp. 82–97] provides a very
readable introduction to de Finetti’s ideas here.
10.1 Markov exchangeability
One example of building analogy by proximity into a probability function is the
concept of Markov exchangeability (describing a form of analogy in time). Suppose
X0,X1,... is an inﬁnite sequence of random outcomes, each taking values in the
set S = {c1,...,ct}. For each n ≥ 1, consider the statistics X0 (the initial state of
the chain) and the transition counts nij recording the number of transitions from
ci to cj in the sequence up to Xn. (That is, the number of times k,0 ≤ k ≤ n−1,
such that Xk = ci and Xk+1 = cj.) If for all n ≥ 1, all sequences X0,...,Xn
starting out in the same initial state x0 and having the same transition counts nij
have the same probability, then the sequence is said to be Markov exchangeable.
Suppose further that the sequence is recurrent: the probability is 1 that Xn =
X0 for inﬁnitely many n. (That is, the sequence returns to the initial state inﬁnitely
often.) There is, it turns out, a de Finetti type representation theorem for the
stochastic structure (probability law) of such sequences: they are precisely the
mixtures of Markov chains, just as ordinary exchangeable sequences are mixtures of
binomial or multinomial outcomes [Diaconis and Freedman, 1980b]. Furthermore
there is also a Johnson-Carnap type rule of succession [Zabell, 1995].
Of course one might ask why Markov exchangeability is a natural assumption
to make. Diaconis and Freedman [Jeﬀrey, 2004, p. 97] put it well: “If someone
... had never heard of Markov chains it seems unlikely that they would hit on
the appropriate notion of partial exchangeability. The notion of symmetry seems
strange at ﬁrst ... A feeling of naturalness only appears after experience and290 S. L. Zabell
reﬂection.” For further discussion of Markov exchangeability and its relation to
inductive logic, see [Skyrms, 1991].
10.2 Analogy by similarity
Given the tentative and limited nature of Carnap’s attempt’s to formulate an
inductive logic that incorporated analogy by similarity, this stood as an obvious
challenge and since Carnap’s death there have been a number of attempts in this
direction; see, e.g., [Romeijn, 2006] and the references there to earlier literature.
Skyrms [1993; 1996] suggests using what he terms “hyperCarnapian” systems:
ﬁnite mixtures of Dirichlet priors. He argues (p. 331): “In a certain sense, this
is the only solution to Carnap’s problem. ... HyperCarnapian inductive methods
are the general solution to Carnap’s problem of analogy by similarity”.
But what if the outcomes are continuous in nature? In order to discuss this, it
will be necessary to ﬁrst revisit the deﬁnition of exchangeability.
10.3 The general deﬁnition of exchangeability
Consider ﬁrst the general deﬁnition of exchangeability. A probability P on the
space of sequences x1,x2,...,xn of real numbers (that is, on Rn) is said to be
(ﬁnitely) exchangeable if it is invariant under all permutations σ of the index set
{1,...,n}; a probability P on the space of inﬁnite sequences x1,x2,... (that is, on
R∞) is said to be inﬁnitely exchangeable if its restriction Pn to ﬁnite sequences
x1,x2,...,xn is exchangeable for each n ≥ 1. There is a sweeping generalization of
the de Finetti representation theorem that characterizes such probabilities.
Some notation, brieﬂy. Let {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ} denote the set of independent and
identically distributed (iid) probabilities on inﬁnite sequences. (That is, if pθ
is a probability measure on R, then Pθ = (pθ)∞ is the corresponding product
measure on R∞. Here θ is just an index for the probabilities on the real line.
Certain measure-theoretic niceties are being swept under the carpet at this point
to simplify the exposition.)
Now suppose that P is an inﬁnitely exchangeable probability on inﬁnite se-
quences. Then there exists a unique probability µ on Θ such that
P =
Z
Θ
Pθ dµ(θ).
That is, every exchangeable P on inﬁnite sequences can be represented as a mix-
ture of independent and identically distributed probabilities. (It is clear that every
mixture of iid sequences is exchangeable; it is the point of the representation the-
orem that conversely every inﬁnitely exchangeable probability arises thus. Aldous
[1986] contains an outstanding survey of this and other generalizations of the orig-
inal de Finetti theorem.)
Thus, in order to arrive at P, it suﬃces to specify µ. Unfortunately, Θ is an
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of the problem of determining P only if one is able to exploit a diﬀerence in inﬁnite
cardinals!
10.4 The pragmatic Bayesian approach
In practical Bayesian statistics one sometimes proceeds as follows. Based on the
background, training, and experience of the statistician, it is judged that the
underlying but unknown distribution pθ of a population of numbers is a member
of some particular parametric family (for example, normal, exponential, geometric,
or Poisson) and it is the task of the statistician to estimate the unknown parameter
θ. The parameter space Θ is now ﬁnite dimensional, often one dimensional.
The mathematical model for a sample from such a population is an iid se-
quence of random variables X1,X2,X3,..., each Xj having distribution pθ, so that
X1,X2,X3,... has distribution Pθ = (pθ)∞. Being a Bayesian, the statistician
assigns a “prior” or initial probability to Θ; the average over Θ using dµ then
speciﬁes a probability P as in the displayed formula above. Given a “random
sample” (iid sequence) X1,...,Xn from the population, the statistician then com-
putes the “posterior” or ﬁnal probability
P(θ|X1,...,Xn)
using Bayes’s theorem.
In general, the larger the sample, the more concentrated the posterior distri-
bution is about some value of the parameter. For example, if the density of pθ
is
pθ(x) =
1
√
2π
exp
￿
(x − θ)2
2
￿
, −∞ < x < ∞,
(that is, normal, standard deviation one, unknown mean θ), then (except for cer-
tain “over-opinionated” priors) the posterior distribution for θ will be concentrated
about ¯ Xn, the sample mean for the random sample X1,...,Xn.
It is apparent that this procedure in fact captures precisely the form of analogical
reasoning that Carnap had in mind. That is, if the sample mean is ¯ Xn = x, then
the resulting posterior distribution expresses support for the belief that the next
observation will be in the vicinity of x, the strength of the evidence for diﬀerent
values y decreasing as the distance of y from x increases.
“But”, the Carnapian may object, “this is an enterprise entirely diﬀerent from
the one Carnap envisaged! There is no logical justiﬁcation proﬀered for the choice
of the parametric family pθ, or the choice of the prior dµ”!! True, but how might
such a justiﬁcation–if it existed–proceed?
Consider the multinomial case in the continuum of inductive methods. There
the de Finetti representation theorem tells us that the most general exchangeable
sequence is a mixture of multinomial probabiities. The elegance of the Johnson-
Carnap approach is that it replaces the essentially arbitrary, albeit mathematically
convenient, quantitative assumption of the practicing Bayesian statistician that
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on ∆t−1) by the purely qualitative suﬃcientness postulate. That is, based on
information received one might well arrive at the purely qualitative judgment
that the probability that the next observation will be of a certain type should
depend only on the number of that type already observed and the total number of
observations to date. This is certainly a more principled approach to the problem
of assigning a prior, in stark contrast to assuming the prior is Dirichlet purely for
reasons of mathematical convenience.
Framed in this way, the form of a principled Bayesian approach to the more
general problem (of deciding on priors for other parametric families) is also clear.
Can one ﬁnd, at least for the most common parametric families in statistics, a
natural qualitative assumption on a sequence of observations in addition to ex-
changeability that implies the sequence is in fact not just an arbitrary mixture of
iid probabilities, but a mixture of distributions strictly within the given paramet-
ric family? For example, what would be an analog of the suﬃcientness postulate
ensuring that an exchangeable sequence is a mixture of normal, or exponential, or
geometric, or Poisson distributions?
10.5 Group invariance and suﬃcient statistics
Thanks to some very deep and hard mathematics on the part of David Freedman,
Persi Diaconis, Phil Dawid, and others, one can in fact answer this question for
many of the most common statistical families. Here are some examples, followed
by a brief summary of the currently known state of the theory.
Let φµ,σ2(x) denote the density of the normal distribution with mean µ and
variance σ2; that is,
φµ,σ2(x) =
1
√
2πσ
exp
￿
−
(x − µ)2
2σ2
￿
.
If a random variable X has such a distribution, then this is denoted X ∼
N(µ,σ2). The ﬁrst example, characterizing exchangeable sequences that are a
mixture of N(0,σ2), is admittedly not the most interesting from a statistical stand-
point, but it provides a simple illustration of the type of results the theory provides.
EXAMPLE 1. An inﬁnite sequence of random variables X1,X2,X3,... is said to
be orthogonally invariant if for every n ≥ 1, the sequence X1,...,Xn is invariant
under all orthogonal transformations of Rn. (An orthogonal transformation is
a linear map that preserves distances. It can be thought as an n-dimensional
rotation.)
Schoenberg’s theorem tells us that every orthogonally invariant inﬁnite sequence
of random variables is a mixture of N(0,σ2) iid random variables. (Note that a
coordinate permutation is a very special kind of orthogonal transformation; thus
orthogonal invariance entails exchangeability and is much more restrictive.) In
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invariant sequence X1,X2,..., and Pσ the distribution of an iid sequence of N(0,σ2)
random variables, then there exists a probability measure Q on [0,∞) such that
P =
Z ∞
0
Pσ dQ(σ).
There is an equivalent formulation of Schoenberg’s theorem in terms of suﬃcient
statistics. Consider the statistic
Tn =
q
X2
1 + ... + X2
n.
Then the property of orthogonal invariance is equivalent to the property that,
for each n ≥ 1, conditional on Tn the distribution of X1,..,Xn is uniform on the
n − 1-sphere of radius Tn. Furthermore, the limit T = limn→∞ Tn/
√
n exists
almost surely and P(T ≤ σ) = Q([−∞,σ)); that is, the mixing measure Q is the
distribution of the limit T.
This has (accepting for the moment that one is willing to talk about inﬁnite
sequences of random variables, about which more later), a striking consequence.
The statistic Tn/
√
n is the standard sample estimate of the standard deviation
σ. Thus one has a natural interpretation of both the Q and the σ appearing in
the de Finetti representation. Far from being merely mathematical objects in the
representation theorem, they acquire a signiﬁcance of their own. The “parameter”
(σ) emerges as the limit of the sample standard deviation (note one is certain of
the existence of the limit but not its value); Q is our degree of belief regarding the
unknown parameter (our uncertainty regarding the value of σ); and conditional
on the limit being σ the sequence is iid N(0,σ2).
Thus one has a complete explication of the role of parameters, parametric fam-
ilies, and priors used by the pragmatic Bayesian statistician in this case. The
particular parametric family arises from the particular strengthening of exchange-
ability (here orthogonal invariance) reﬂecting the knowledge of the statistician in
this case. (If he doesn’t subscribe to orthogonal invariance, he shouldn’t be using
a mixture of mean zero normals!) The single parameter σ is interpreted as the
large sample limit of the sample standard deviation; and the mixing measure Q
reﬂects our degree of belief as to the value of this limit. Very neat!
EXAMPLE 2. Suppose P is a mixture of iid N(µ,σ2) normals. Then it is easy to
see that P is invariant under transformations that are orthogonal and preserves
the line Ln : x1 = x2 = ... = xn. Dawid’s theorem states that this is in fact the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for P to be such a mixture. In this case there
are two suﬃcient statistics:
Un = X1 + ... + Xn, Vn =
q
X2
1 + ... + X2
n;
and the symmetry assumption is equivalent to the property that, conditional on
Un,Vn, the distribution of X1,...,Xn is uniform on the resulting (n − 2)-sphere.
Furthermore, one has that the limits
U = lim
n→∞Un/n, V = lim
n→∞Vn/
√
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exist almost surely and generate the mixing measure on the two-dimensional pa-
rameter space R × [0,∞).
Characterizations of this kind are known for a number of standard statistical
distributions. Many of these form “exponential families”; Diaconis and Ylvisaker
[1980] characterize the conjugate priors for such families in terms of the linearity
of their posterior expectations. In other cases the challenge remains to ﬁnd such
characterizations, preferably in terms of both symmetry condition and suﬃcient
statistics. Diaconis and Freedman [1984] is an outstanding exposition, describing
many such results and placing them into a uniﬁed theoretical superstructure.
In sum: Carnap recognized the limited utility of the inductive inferences that the
continuum of inductive methods provided, and sought to extend his analysis to the
case of analogical inductive inference: an observation of a given type makes more
probable not merely observations of the exact same type but also observations of a
“similar” type. The challenge lies both in making precise the meaning of “similar”,
and in being able to then derive the corresponding continua.
Carnap sought to meet the ﬁrst challenge by proposing that underlying judge-
ments of similarity is some notion of “distance” between predicates; but then
immediately hit the brick wall of how one could use a general notion of distance
to derive plausible continua. Neither Carnap nor any of his successors were able
to solve this problem (although not for want of trying).
The Diaconis-Freedman theory enables us to see why. If one recognizes that the
problem of analogical reasoning is essentially that of justifying parametric Bayesian
inference, then it is indeed possible to derive attractive results that parallel those
for the multinomial case. But these results are not trivial; they involve very hard
mathematics, and although many special cases have been successfully tackled, it
is possible to argue that no complete theoretical superstructure yet exists.
11 THE SAMPLING OF SPECIES PROBLEM
Another important problem concerns the nature of inductive inference when the
possible types or species are initially unknown (this is sometimes referred to in
the statistical literature as the sampling of species problem). Carnap thought this
could be done using the equivalence relation R: belongs to the same species as.
(That is, one has a notion of equivalence or common membership in a species,
without prior knowledge of that species.) Carnap did not pursue this idea further,
however, thinking the attempt premature given the relatively primitive state of
the subject at that time.
Carnap’s intuition was entirely on the mark here. One can construct a theory
for the sampling of species problem, one that parallels the classical continuum
of inductive methods — but the attendant technical diﬃculties are considerable,
exchangeable random sequences being replaced by exchangeable random partitions.
(Two sequences generate the same partition if they have the same frequencies of
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Kingman did the necessary technical spadework in a brilliant series of papers a
quarter of a century ago. Kingman’s beautiful results enable one to establish a
parallel inductive theory for this case, including a Johnson-type characterization
of an analogous continuum of inductive methods; see [Zabell, 1992; 1997].
In brief, consider the following three axioms, that parallel (in two cases) or
extend (in one case) those of Johnson.
1. All sequences of outcomes are possible (have positive probability).
2. The probability of seeing on the next trial the i-th species already seen, is a
function of the number of times that species has been observed, ni, and the
total sample size n: f(ni,n).
3. The probability of observing a new species is a function only of the number
of species already observed t and the sample size n: g(t,n).
It is a remarkable fact that if these three assumptions are satisﬁed, then one
can prove that the functions f(ni,n),g(t,n) are members of a three-dimensional
continuum described by three parameters α,θ,γ.
The continuum of inductive methods for the sampling of species
Case 1: If ni < n for some i, then
f(ni,n) =
ni − α
n + θ
, g(t,n) =
tα + θ
n + θ
.
Note that if ni < n, then t > 1, there are at least two species, and the universal
generalization is disconﬁrmed.
Case 2: If ni = n for some i, then
f(ni,n) =
ni − α
n + θ
+ cn(γ), g(t,n) =
tα + θ
n + θ
− cn(γ);
here
cn(γ) =
γ(α + θ)
(n + θ)
"
γ + (α + θ − γ)
n−1 Q
j=1
￿
j − α
j + θ
￿#
represents the increase in the probability of seeing the i-th species again due to the
conﬁrmation of the universal generalization. Not all parameter values are possible:
one must have
0 ≤ α < 1; θ > −α; 0 ≤ γ < α + θ.
There is a simple interpretation of the three parameters θ,α,γ. The ﬁrst, θ,
is related to the likelihood of new species being observed; the larger the value
of θ, the more likely it is that the next observation is that of a new species.296 S. L. Zabell
Observation of a new species has a double inductive import: it is a new species,
and it is a particular species. Observing it contributes both to the likelihood that
a new species will again be observed and, if a new species is not observed, that
the species just observed will again be observed (as opposed to another species
already observed); this is the role of α. Finally, the parameter γ is related to the
likelihood that only one species will be observed. If ￿ is the initial probability that
there will only be one species, then γ = (α + θ)￿.
The special case α = γ = 0 is of particular interest. In this case the probability
of an “allelic partition” (set of frequencies of frequencies ar) has a particularly
simple form: given a sample of size n,
P(a1,a2,...,an) =
n!
θ(θ + 1)...(θ + n − 1)
n Y
r=1
θar
rarar!
;
this is the Ewens sampling formula. There is a simple urn model for such a process
in this case, analogous to the Polya urn model [Hoppe, 1984]. Suppose we start
out with an urn containing a single, black ball: the mutator. The ﬁrst time we
select a ball, it is necessarily the black one. We replace it, together with a ball
of some color. As time progresses, the urn contains the mutator and a number of
colored balls. Each colored ball has a weight of one, the mutator has weight θ.
The likelihood of selecting a ball is proportional to its weight. If a colored ball is
selected, it is replaced together with a ball of the same color; this corresponds to
observing a species that has already been observed before (hence balls of its color
are already present). If the mutator is selected, it is replaced, together with a ball
of a new color; this corresponds to observing a new species. It is not diﬃcult to
verify that the rules of succession for this process are
f(ni,n) =
ni
n + θ
; g(n) =
θ
n + θ
.
Note that in this case the probability of a new species does not depend on the
number observed. Such predictive probabilities arguably go back to De Morgan;
see [Zabell, 1992].
12 A BUDGET OF PARADOXES
Strictly speaking, true paradox (in the sense of a basic contradiction in the theory
itself) is no more possible in the Bayesian framework than it is in propositional
logic: both are theories of consistency of input. The term “paradox” is often
used instead to describe either some unexpected (but reasonable) consequence of
the theory (so that we learn something from it); or an inconsistency arising from
conﬂicting sets of inputs (which is what the theory is supposed to detect); or
an apparent failure of the theory to explain what we regard as a valid intuition
(which should be viewed as more of a challenge than a paradox). Nevertheless,
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into a subject, and the theory of probability has certainly had its fair share of such
“challenge problems”.
In the following paragraphs a few of these paradoxes are brieﬂy noticed, more
by way of initial orientation and an entry into the literature, than any detailed
analysis. Indeed the literature on all of these is considerable.
12.1 The paradoxes of conditional probability
There is an amusing and interesting literature concerning conditional probability
paradoxes such as the paradox of the second ace [Shafer, 1985], the three pris-
oner paradox [Falk, 1992], and the two-envelope paradox [Katz and Olin, 2007].
The unnecessary controversies that sometimes arise over these (for example, in
Philosophy of Science and The American Statistician, names omitted to protect
the guilty) are object lessons in the pitfalls that can attend informal attempts
to analyze problems based on vague intuitions without the rigor of ﬁrst carefully
deﬁning the sample space of possibilities or modeling the way information is re-
ceived. Properly understood these puzzles serve as examples of the utility of the
theory, not its deﬁciencies.
12.2 Hempel’s paradox of the ravens
Nicod’s criterion states that an assertion “all A are B” is supported by an obser-
vation of an A that is also a B; Hempel’s equivalence condition that two logically
equivalent propositions are equally conﬁrmed by the same evidence. Hempel’s
paradox [Hempel, 1945], in its best-known (or most notorious) form considers the
assertion “all ravens are black”. This is equivalent to its contrapositive, “all non-
black objects are not ravens”. If one then observes a pink elephant, does this
conﬁrm the proposition “all ravens are black”?
Strictly speaking this is not a paradox of logical or subjective probability, be-
cause it follows just from Nicod’s criterion and the equivalence condition. It is
in any case easily accommodated within the Bayesian framework which, in brief,
notes that pink elephants can indeed conﬁrm black ravens, albeit to a very slight
degree; see, e.g., [Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, 1940; Good, 1960]. Vranas [2004a], How-
son and Urbach [2006, pp. 99–103], Fitelson [2008] provide entries to the recent
literature; Sprenger [2009] provides a general survey and assessment.
12.3 Goodman’s new riddle of induction
For Carnap, probability1 is analytic and syntactic; probability2 synthetic and se-
mantic. Returning in 1941 to Keynes’s Treatise on Probability with increased
appreciation, Carnap sought to provide a satisfactory technical and quantitative
foundation for inductive inference he saw as absent in Keynes. But after his paper
proposing a purely syntactic justiﬁcation for inductive inference [Carnap, 1945b],
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the example later put forward by Goodman in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1954),
under the striking heading of “the new riddle of induction”, Goodman deﬁned a
predicate grue: say an object is grue if, for some ﬁxed time t, it is green before
t and blue after. If all emeralds observed prior to time t are green, then this is
equally consistent with their being either green and grue, and therefore apparently
supports to an equal degree the expectation that emeralds observed after time t
will be either green or red.
Goodman’s conclusion was that inductive inference is not purely syntactic in
nature; that to varying degrees predicates are more or less projectible, projectabil-
ity depending on the extent to which a predicate is entrenched in natural language.
Although Goodman and Carnap soon agreed to disagree, there was no escape; and
Goodman’s point is now generally accepted. (Carnap sought to meet this objection
by invoking his requirement of total evidence, of which more in a moment.)
Goodman’s “new riddle” has sparked a substantial literature (see, e.g., [Stalker,
1994]). For a recent survey, see Schwartz [2009]. From a Bayesian perspective,
projectability is eﬀectively a question of the presence of exchangeability (or par-
tially exchangeability); and as such this literature may be viewed as a complement
to, rather than rival of the subjectivist position (see, e.g., [Horwich, 1982, pp. 67–
72]). For Carnap’s ﬁnal views on grue, see [Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971, pp. 73–76].
12.4 The principle of total evidence
Carnap’s initial defense to Goodman’s example was to invoke a requirement of
total evidence, that
in the application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation,
the total evidence available must be taken as basis for determining the
degree of conﬁrmation. [Carnap, 1950, p. 211]
This closed one hole in the dike, only for another to arise. In 1957 Ayer raised
a fundamental question: in any purely logical theory of probability, why are new
observations important? This is an issue that, as Good [1967] observes, is both
related to the principle of total evidence and relevant to subjective theories of
probability. Good’s solution to the conundrum was a neat one:
[I]n expectation, it pays to take into account further evidence, provided
that the cost of collecting and using this evidence, although positive,
can be ignored. In particular, we, should use all the evidence already
available, provided that the cost of doing so is negligible. With this
proviso then, the principle of total evidence follows from the principle
of rationality [that is, of maximizing expected utility].
For further discussion of the principle of total evidence, see [Skyrms, 1987]; for the
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Related questions here are Glymour’s problem of old evidence (if a theory T en-
tails an experimental outcome E, but one observes E before this is discovered, does
this increase the probability of T?), see, e.g., [Garber, 1983; Jeﬀrey, 1992, Chap-
ter 5; Earman, 1992, Chapter 5; Jeﬀrey, 2004, pp. 44-47; Howson and Urbach,
2006, pp. 197–20]; and I. J. Good’s concept of dynamic (or evolving) probability
[Good, 1983, Chapter 10]. Central to both is the issue of the appropriateness of
the principle of logical omniscience: if H logically entails E, then P(E | H) = 1.
As Good notes [1983, p. 107], invoking a standard chestnut, it makes sense for
purposes of betting to assign a probability of 1/10 that the millionth digit of π is
a 7, even though one can, given suﬃcient times and resources, compute the actual
digit (so that some would argue that the probability is either 0 or 1 depending).
Discussion of this issue goes back at least to Polya [1941]; Hacking [1967] deals
with the issue in terms of sentences that are “personally possible”. (Of course from
a practical Bayesian perspective one simple solution is to work with probabilities
deﬁned on subsets of a sample space rather than logical propositions or sentences.
Thus in the case of π, take the sample space to be the set {0,1,...,9}, and assign
a coherent probability to the elements of the set. Whether or not it is proﬁtable
to expand the sample space to accommodate further events then goes to the issue
of the value of further knowledge.)
12.5 The Popper-Carnap controversy and Miller’s paradox
Karl Popper was a lifelong and dogged opponent of Carnap’s inductivist views.
In Appendix 7 of his Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery [Popper, 1968] Popper made
the claim that the logical probability of a universal generalization must be zero;
today this can only be regarded as an historical curiosity. For two critiques (among
many) of Popper’s claim, see [Howson, 1973; 1987].
For those interested in the more general debate between Popper and Carnap,
their exchange in the Schillp volume on Carnap [Schillp, 1963] is a natural place
to start. For a general overview, see [Niiniluoto, 1973]. One important thread
in the debate was Miller’s paradox; Jeﬀrey [1975] is at once a useful reprise of
the initial debate, and a spirited rebuttal. Closely related to Miller’s paradox is
Lewis’s “principal principle”; see [Vranas, 2004b] for a recent discussion and many
earlier references. For a more sympathetic view of Popper than the one here, see
[Miller, 1997].
13 CARNAP REDUX
Thus far we have discussed Carnap’s basic views regarding probability and induc-
tive inference, some of his technical contributions to this area, and some of the
extensions of Carnap’s approach that took place during his lifetime and after. In
this ﬁnal part of the chapter we return to the philosophical (rather than technical)300 S. L. Zabell
underpinnings of Carnap’s approach, and attempt to place them in the context of
both his predecessors and his successors.
13.1 “Two concepts of probability”
In his 1945 paper “The Two Concepts of Probability”, Carnap advanced his view
of “the problem of probability’. Noting a “bewildering multiplicity” of theories
that had been advanced over the course of more than two and a half centuries,
Carnap suggested one had to carefully steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of
assuming either too few or too many underlying explicanda, and settled on just
two. These two underlying concepts Carnap called probability1 and probability2:
degree of conﬁrmation versus relative frequency in the long run.
Carnap’s identiﬁcation of these two basic kingdoms of probability was not how-
ever novel; it is clearly stated in Poisson’s 1837 treatise on probability (where
Poisson uses the terms probability and chance to distinguish the two). Thus Pois-
son writes:
In this work, the word chance will refer to events in themselves, in-
dependent of our knowledge of them, and we will retain the word
probability ... for the reason we have to believe. [Poisson, 1837, p.
31]
Much the same distinction was made shortly after by Cournot [1843], Exposition
de la theorie des chances et des probabilit´ es, where he notes its “double sense”,
which he refers to as subjective and objective, a terminology also found later in
[Bertrand, 1890] and [Poincar´ e, 1896]. Hacking [1975, p. 14] sees the distinction
as going even further back to Condorcet in 1785. For discussion of Poisson and
Cournot, see [Good, 1986, pp. 157–160; Hacking, 1990, pp. 96–99].
In the 20th century, Frank Plumpton Ramsey, one of the great architects of the
modern subjective theory, likewise noted the possible validity of both senses:
In this essay the Theory of Probability is taken as a branch of logic,
the logic of partial belief and inconclusive argument; but there is no
intention of implying that this is the only or even the most important
aspect of the subject. Probability is of fundamental importance not
only in logic but also in statistical and physical science, and we cannot
be sure beforehand that the most useful interpretation of it in logic will
be appropriate in physics also. Indeed the general diﬀerence of opinion
between statisticians who for the most part adopt the frequency theory
of probability and logicians who mostly reject it renders it likely that
the two schools are really discussing diﬀerent things, and that the word
’probability’ is used by logicians in one sense and by statisticians in
another.
This is as clear a statement of Carnap’s distinction as one might imagine. (It
can also be found clearly stated in a number of other places such as [Polya, 1941;
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Thus, although the clear recognition of the fundamentally dual nature of prob-
ability did not originate with Carnap, the importance of his contribution is this:
despite clear statements by Poisson in the 19th century, Ramsey in the 20th, and
others both before and after, the lesson had not been learned; and even those
who recognized the duality implicit in the usage of the word for the most part
believed this to reﬂect a confusion of thought, only one of the two senses being
truly legitimate. By carefully, forcefully, and in sustained fashion arguing for the
legitimacy of both, Carnap enabled the distinction to at last become an entrenched
philosophical commonplace. “The duality of probability has long been known to
philosophers. The present generation may have learnt it from Carnap’s weighty
Logical Foundations” [Hacking, 1975, p. 13].
13.2 The later Carnap
Just as there is an early and later Wittgenstein, there is an early and later Carnap
in inductive logic. Some of these changes were technical, but others reﬂected
substantial shifts in Carnap’s underlying views.
The appearance of Carnap’s book generated considerable discussion and debate
in the philosophical community. A second volume was promised, but never ap-
peared. Like many before him, who found themselves enmeshed in the intellectual
quicksand of the problem of induction (such as Bernoulli and Bayes), Carnap con-
tinued to grapple with the problem, reﬁning and extending his results, but found
that new advances and insights (on the part of himself, his collaborators, and
others) were coming so quickly that he eventually abandoned as impractical the
project of a deﬁnitive and systematic book-length treatment in favor of publishing
from time to time compilations of progress reports. Two such installments eventu-
ally appeared [Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971; Jeﬀrey, 1980], although even these were
delayed far past their initially anticipated date of publication.
Because no true successor to his Logical Foundations of Probability ever ap-
peared, it is not always appreciated just how much of an evolution in Carnap’s
views about probability took place over the last two decades of his life. This change
reﬂected in part a changing environment: the increasing appreciation of the pre-
war contributions of Ramsey and de Finetti, and the publication of such books
as [Good, 1950; Savage, 1954; Raiﬀa and Schlaifer, 1961]. Important materials
in documenting this shift include the introduction to the second [1962] edition of
[Carnap, 1950], his paper “The aim of inductive logic” ([Carnap, 1962], reprinted
in revised form in [Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971, Chapter 1]), Carnap’s contributions
to the Schilpp [1963] volume, and his posthumous “Basic system of inductive logic”
([Carnap and Jeﬀrey, 1971, Chapter 2; Jeﬀrey, 1980, Chapter 6]).
Technical shifts
Some of these shifts, although technical in nature, were quite important. First,
there was a shift from sentences in a formal language to (eﬀectively) subsets of302 S. L. Zabell
a sample space. This reﬂected in part a desire to use the technical apparatus of
modern mathematical probability, and in part
a desire to formulate inductive logic in terms that had come to be
standard in mathematical probability theory and theoretical statis-
tics, where probabilities are attributed to “events” or (“propositions”)
which are construed as sets of entities which can handily be taken to
be models, in the sense in which that term is used in logic. [Carnap
and Jeﬀrey, 1971, p.1]
Second, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Carnap accepted the
Ramsey–de Finetti–Savage link of probability to utility and decision making, its
betting odds interpretation, the use of coherence and the Dutch book to derive
the basic axioms of probability, and the central role of Bayes’s theorem in belief
revision. This placed Carnap squarely in the Bayesian camp, the diﬀerences com-
ing down to ones of the existence or status of further epistemic constraints. This
change came fairly quickly; it is already evident in Carnap’s 1955 lecture notes
[Carnap, 1973]. It is carefully stated in Carnap [1962] and then systematically
elaborated in his Basic System.
Carnap also announced in the preface to his second edition of Logical Foun-
dations the abandonment of his requirements of logical independence (replacing
it by Kemeny’s “meaning postulates”), and completeness for primitive predicates
(replacing it by axioms relevant to language extensions). These are of less interest
to us here.
The emerging Bayesian majority
Carnap’s shift to the subjective was certainly noted by others. I. J. Good, for
example, remarks “Between 1950 and 1961 Carnap moved close to my position in
that he showed a much increased respect for the practical use of subjective proba-
bilities” [Good, 1975, p. 41; see also p. 40, Figure 1]. But for the best evidence of
this convergence of view between Carnap and the subjectivists, however, one can
summon Carnap himself as a witness. In his Basic System (his last, posthumously
published work on inductive inference), Carnap tells us
I think there need not be a controversy between the objectivist point
of view and the subjectivist or personalist point of view. Both have
a legitimate place in the context of our work, that is, the construc-
tion of a set of rules for determining probability values with respect
to possible evidence. At each step in the construction, a choice is to
be made; the choice is not completely free but is restricted by cer-
tain boundaries. Basically, there is merely a diﬀerence in attitude or
emphasis between the subjectivist tendency to emphasize the existing
freedom of choice, and the objectivist tendency to stress the existence
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The ultimate diﬀerence between Carnap and subjectivists of the de Finetti–
Savage–Good stripe, then, appears to be how they view the logical status of these
additional constraints. Carnap seems to have thought of them as forming in some
sense a sequence or hierarchy (thus his “at each step in the construction”); modern
Bayesians, in contrast, view these more as auxiliary tools. They do not deny the
utility of the symmetry arguments that underly much of the Carnapian approach
but, as Savage remarks, they “typically do not ﬁnd the contexts in which such
agreement obtains suﬃciently deﬁnable to admit of expression in a postulate”
[Savage, 1954, p. 66]. Such arguments fall instead under the rubric of what I. J.
Good terms “suggestions for using the theory, these suggestions belonging to the
technique rather than the theory” itself [Good, 1952, p. 107].
Let us take this a little further. Is what is at stake really just a “diﬀerence in
attitude or emphasis” between choice and limitation? Here is how W. E. Johnson
himself saw the enterprise (as he notes in his paper deriving the continuum of
inductive methods):
the postulate adopted in a controversial kind of theorem cannot be
generalized to cover all sorts of working problems; so it is the logician’s
business, having once formulated a speciﬁc postulate, to indicate very
carefully the factual and epistemic conditions under which it has prac-
tical value. [Johnson, 1932, pp. 418–419]
This is surely right. There are no universally applicable postulates: diﬀerent
symmetry assumptions are appropriate under diﬀerent circumstances, none is log-
ically compulsory. The best one can do is identify symmetry assumptions that
seem natural, have identiﬁable consequences, and may be a natural reﬂection of
one’s beliefs under some reasonable set of circumstances. In judging the appropri-
ate use of the suﬃcientness postulate, for example, the issue is not one of favoring
“limitation” versus “choice”; it is one of whether or not you think the postulate
accurately captures the epistemic situation at hand. This is the mission of partial
exchangeability: to ﬁnd diﬀerent possible qualitative descriptions of the “the fac-
tual and epistemic conditions” that obtain in actual situations, descriptions that
then turn out to have useful and satisfying quantitative implications.
From credence to credibility
Nevertheless Carnap did argue for additional symmetry requirements such as ex-
changeability; his explanation of this is perhaps most clearly presented in his 1962
paper “The aim of inductive logic”. It will be apparent that Carnap and the sub-
jectivists part company at this point because they had radically diﬀerent goals.
Let Crt denote the subjective probability of an individual at time n, termed
by Carnap credence. Using Bayes’s rule, Carnap imagines a sequence of steps in
which one obtains discrete quanta of data Ej,j = 1,2,..., giving rise in turn to a
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In the case of a human being we would hesitate to ascribe to him a
credence function at a very early time point, before his abilities of
reason and deliberate action are suﬃciently developed. But again we
disregard this diﬃculty by thinking either of an idealized human baby
or of a robot. ... [L]et us acribe to him an inital credence function Cr0
for the time point T0 before he obtains his ﬁrst datum E1.
(This curiously echos Price’s analysis of inductive inference in his appendix to
Bayes’s essay; see [Zabell, 1997, Section 3].)
The subsequent conditional credences based on this initial credence Cr0 Carnap
terms a credibility; and contrasts these with the “adult credence functions” of
Ramsey, Savage, and de Finetti:
When I propose to take as a basic concept, not adult credence, but ei-
ther initial credence or credibility, I must admit that these concepts are
less realistic and remoter from overt behavior and may therefore ap-
pear as elusive and dubious. On the other hand, when we are interested
in rational decision theory, these concepts have great methodological
advantages. Only for these concepts, not for credence, can we ﬁnd
a suﬃcient number of requirements of rationality as a basis for the
construction of a system of inductive logic.
Thus Carnap asserts there are additional rationality requirements for Cr0, ones
having “no analogue for credence functions”; for example, symmetry of individuals
(i.e., exchangeability). The assertion is that absent identiﬁable diﬀerences between
individuals at the initial time T0 (and since we are at the initial time T0 we have
not yet learned of any), the probability of any proposition involving two or more
individuals should remain unchanged if the individuals are permuted (see [Carnap
1962, pp. 313–314; 1971, p. 118]). Carnap regards this as “the valid core of the
old principle of indiﬀerence ... the basic idea of the principle is sound. Our task
is to restate it by speciﬁc restricted axioms” [Carnap, 1962, p. 316; 1973, p. 277].
No wonder this part of Carnap’s program never gained traction! It focuses on
the credences of an “idealized human baby” rather than an adult; appeals to a
state of complete ignorance; and presents itself as a rehabilitated version of the
principle of indiﬀerence. And what does it mean to talk about individuals about
what we know nothing except that they are diﬀerent? In the end one exchanges
one problem for another, replacing the task of ﬁnding a probability function by the
(in fact much more daunting and questionable) task of establishing the existence
of an underlying ideal language, one in which the description of sense experiences
can be broken down into atomic interchangeable elements.
Such ideal languages are a seductive dream that in one form or another go back
centuries, as in John Wilkins’s philosophical language, or Leibniz’s “character-
istica universalis”, which Leibniz thought could be used as the basis of a logical
probability [Hacking, 1975, Chapter 15]. If Wittgenstein’s early program of logical
atomism had been successful, then logical probability might be possible, but the
failure of the former dooms the latter. Lacking an ultimate language in one-to-oneCarnap and the Logic of Inductive Inference 305
correspondence with reality, Carnapian programs retain an irreducible element of
subjectivism.
Despite the ultimate futility of Carnap’s program to justify induction in quan-
titative terms, the subjective Bayesian does provide a number of qualitative ex-
plicata. Inductive rationality in a single individual is not so much a matter of
present opinion as the ability to be persuaded by further facts; and for two or
more individuals by their ultimate arrival at consensus. To this end a number of
results regarding convergence and merging of opinion have been discovered. For
convergence of opinion see Skyrms [2006], and the earlier literature cited there; for
merging of opinion see the classic paper of Blackwell and Dubins [1962] and the
discussion in [Earman, 1992], as well as [Kalai and Lehrer, 1994] and [Miller and
Sanchirico, 1999].
For further discussion of Carnap’s program for inductive logic in its ﬁnal form,
see [Jeﬀrey, 1973].
14 CONCLUSION
Like his distinguished predecessors Bernoulli and Bayes, Rudolph Carnap contin-
ued to grapple with the elusive riddle of induction for the rest of his life. Through-
out he was an eﬀective spokesman for his point of view. But although the technical
contributions of Carnap and his invisible college (such as Kemeny, Bar-Hillel, Jef-
frey, Gaifman, Hintikka, Niiniluoto, Kuipers, Costantini, di Maio, and others)
remain of considerable interest even today, Carnap’s most lasting inﬂuence was
more subtle but also more important: he largely shaped the way current philos-
ophy views the nature and role of probability, in particular its widespread accep-
tance of the Bayesian paradigm (as, for example, in [Horwich, 1982; Earman, 1992;
Mayer, 1993; Jaynes, 2003; Boven and Hartman, 2004; Jeﬀrey, 2004; Howson and
Urbach, 2006]).
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